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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
EUROPEAN AMERICAN REALTY, LTD. * 
FILED IN OFFICE 
I 
and SCOTT K. TOBERMAN, * AUG 312007 
* 
Plaintiffs, * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
U1Y cLERK SUPERIOR COufIT 
QEP fIlL10N COUNT( GA 
v. Civil Action File No. 2005- - 05849 
DAVID LANG, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT & MOTION TO STRIKE 
TESTIMONY 
The above-styled case is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary 
judgment, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the counterclaims, and 
Defendant's motion to strike contradictory testimony. The Court held a hearing on these 
motions on August 23, 2007. Plaintiffs European American Realty, LTD ("EAR") and 
Scott K. Toberman ("Mr. Tob.erman") did not participate in the hearing. After 
considering the briefs filed on behalf of the parties (including Plaintiffs'), the case record, 
and the oral argument presented by Defendant, the Court finds as follows: 
I. Facts 
This case arises from Defendant Lang's final months of employment with EAR, 
his termination from EAR, and the months following his termination. The undisputed 
facts, which form the basis of this Order, are summarized below. 
Defendant Lang was an Executive Vice President of EAR and worked closely 
with Mr. Toberman overseeing the development and sales of condominiums. EAR, Mr. 
Toberman, and Mr. Lang also worked with VEF V Holdings LLC ("VEF") and the 
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entities referred to as the GEF Partnerships' on three (3) condo conversion projects. In 
addition to the condo conversion projects, the parties were jointly involved in other 
business ventures. For example, VEF acted as a lender to La Tour Partners LLC (in 
which Mr. Lang claims an indirect ownership interest), Austerlitz Partners LLC (in which 
Mr. Lang claims to be a member and an indirect owner), and Bonapart Partners LLC (in 
which Mr. Lang claims an indirect ownership interest through his ownership interest in 
Austerlitz). Mr. Toberman and/or EAR hold a primary ownership interest in each of the 
three (3) companies to which VEF acted as a lender. The GEF Partnerships, through 
their investment in Montrachet Partnership LLC, also hold an ownership interest in 
Bonapart Partners LLC, in addition to other Mr. TobermanlEAR controlled entities. 
In the spring of 2005, a dispute arose between Mr. Toberman and the GEF 
Partnerships, which ultimately resulted in Mr. Toberman and the GEF Partnerships 
entering into a binding term sheet (the "BTS"). In the BTS, Mr. Toberman agreed to pay 
to the GEF Partnerships cash, real estate, interests in condominium project, and 
partnership interests in exchange for a release of potential claims against him. The BTS 
contained a confidentiality provision that stated: 
This term sheet shall be kept confidential and not disclosed 
to any third parties, except as may be necessary (i) to the 
parties' respective partners, members, attorneys, agents, 
employees, accountants and banks, (ii) to comply with the 
terms hereof or to enforce the rights and/or obligations of 
the parties hereto, or (iii) in response to any court order or 
lawful subpoena. 
I The GEF Partnerships include Mr. Gootrad, Mr. Engerrnan. & Mr. Frishman, individually, and their 
various entities. 
2 
o 
o 
o 
In April of 2005, Mr. Toberman and Mr. Lang had a conference call with Kenneth 
Kraft, Esq., counsel to EAR at the time. Mr. Kraft advised Mr. Lang and Mr. Toberman 
to disclose to VEF the dispute2 between Mr. Toberman and the GEF Partnerships. 
On July 24, 2005, Mr. Lang met with Mr. Huang, CFO of VEF. During this 
meeting, Mr. Lang disclosed the dispute between Mr. Toberman and the GEF 
Partnerships, and showed him the BTS. On July 29, 2005, Mr. Huang circulated an 
action plan to Mr. Gootrad, a primary investor in the GEF Partnerships, to mitigate the 
effects of the dispute on outstanding condo conversion projects. Mr. Huang's plan 
included having Mr. Lang create a new management company to oversee the final stages 
of the condo conversion projects. During a conference call on August 3, 2005, Mr. 
Huang, Mr. Toberman, and Mr. Gootrad discussed the outstanding condo conversion 
projects. Mr. Huang stated in his affidavit that during this conversation, the three men 
agreed that Mr. Lang would form a new company to finish the projects. On August 4, 
2005, William Beltman, attorney for EAR and Mr. Toberman, sent an email to counsel 
for the GEF Partnerships which proposed that Mr. Lang was to form a new entity and 
then hire Thomas Spiro, a then-current EAR employee, to finish the condo conversion 
projects and which stated that Mr. Huang agreed to the proposed restructuring. 
There is no dispute that Mr. Toberman was aware that Mr. Lang was planning to 
form a new company, and that Mr. Lang intended to offer Mr. Spiro a position with the 
new company. On August 4, 2005, Mr. Toberman discussed this potential job offer with 
Mr. Spiro and asked to be informed of the details. On August 4,2005, Mr. Lang offered 
Mr. Spiro ajob with the new company. Mr. Lang, however, never formed a new 
, Mr. Lang provided deposition testimony that Mr. Kraft encouraged the disclosure of the TobermaniGEF 
Partnerships dispute to VEF. Mr. Toberman provided an affidavit that Mr. Kraft did not encourage 
disclosure of the BTS to VEF. 
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company; consequently, Mr. Spiro was not hired. By August 26,2005,' Mr. Lang's 
relationship with Mr. Toberman and employment with EAR were terminated. 
On September 22,2005, Kevin Dorr, an at-will EAR employee, sent a letter to 
Mr. Lang. at Mr. Lang's request, describing the financial and operating conditions of the 
Discovery Palms condos, which was one of the three (3) ongoing condo conversion 
projects. 
On September 26,2005, Mr. Lang's EAR email account was accessed and an 
August 18, 2005, email chain containing the budget of the Discovery Palms project was 
forwarded to Lisa Richards, another EAR employee who was working with GEF 
Partnerships to supply them with information of Mr. Toberman's alleged embezzlement. 
That same day, Ms. Richards then forwarded the August 18th email chain to a second 
email account of Mr. Lang's (dave@earpmi.com),4 and from there the email was sent to 
the GEF Partnerships and VEF. 
II. Standard of Law 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
demonstrate that "there is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, to warrant judgment as a matter of law." Lau's Corp. 
v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531, 532 
(2005). 
III. Defendant David Lang's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Defendant David Lang brought a motion for summary judgment on all nine (9) 
counts of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
J There is some dispute in the record about whether Mr. Lang was terminated on August 25th or August 
26th• 
4 The dave@earomi.com email account is not the EAR email account. EAR PM! was a separate company 
from EAR which was created by Mr. Gootrad and in which Mr. Lang had an email account. 
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A. Counts III and IX, Breach of Duty 
Plaintiffs Mr. Tobennan and EAR allege that Mr. Lang breached his fiduciary 
duty as an officer of EAR by (I) establishing a competitive company, (2) soliciting EAR 
employees, and (3) divulging EAR confidential information. Additionally, Plaintiffs 
allege that Mr. Lang breached his duty of good faith to EAR by (4) approaching VEF, a 
business contact of EAR. 
The internal affairs of foreign corporations are governed by the laws of the state 
of incorporation. Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects and Planners, 
Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735-736 (1985); see also, Multi-Media Holdings. Inc. v. Piedmont 15 
LLC, 262 Ga. App. 283 (2003). EAR is a corporation fonned under the laws of the state 
of Illinois. Obligations of officers and fiduciary duties are questions of internal affairs; 
thus, the breach of duty counts shall be evaluated under Illinois law. Id.; see also, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 309 (2007). 
Under Illinois law, a corporate officer owes a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their 
corporate employer not to exploit their position for their own gain (self-dealing) or to 
impede the operation of the corporation (obstacle to corporate objectives). The following 
are examples of officer fiduciary duty breaches under Illinois law: 
(1) fail[ing] to inform the company that employees are 
forming a rival company or engaging in other fiduciary 
breaches; (2) solicit[ing] the business of a single customer 
before leaving the company; (3) us[ing] the company's 
facilities or equipment to assist them in developing their 
new business; or (4) solicit[ing] fellow employees to join a 
rival business. 
Cooper Linse Hallman Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Hallman, 856 N.E. 2d 585,589 (III. App. 
Ct. 2006). In addition, officers may also breach their fiduciary duty if they use "the 
o company's confidential business information for the new business, either before or after 
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[their] departure." Id. (finding a breach of fiduciary duty for failing to inform the 
company of the formation of a competing corporation, soliciting fellow employees, 
soliciting business contacts prior to resignation, and using confidential corporate 
information); see also, Dowd & Dowd, Ltd, v, Gleason, 816 N.E. 2d 754, 762 (III. App. 
Ct. 2004). 
1. Forming a Rival Business & Soliciting EAR Employees 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang's offer of employment in a new company to Mr. 
Spiro while both were employed by EAR breached Mr. Lang's duty of fiduciary duty to 
EAR. 
Mr. Gootrad, Mr. Huang, and Mr. Lang provided testimony that it was the 
agreement of EAR, the GEF Partnerships, and VEF that Mr. Lang would form a new 
company to finalize the condo conversion projects. Mr. Toberman also acknowledged 
that he told Mr. Spiro of Mr. Lang's impending job offer with the new company and 
asked him to report back the details of it. Mr. Toberman, however, disputes that Mr, 
Lang ever had "authority" to form the new company. Additionally, all of the evidence is 
that the new company was not to be a rival company in competition with EAR, but was 
to be a company that would facilitate the completion of the three (3) condo conversion 
projects put in jeopardy as a result of the TobermaniGEF Partnerships dispute and the 
BTS, 
Agreement speaks to an understanding or a meeting of the minds whereas 
authority speaks to procedures or formal steps to approve an action.5 Thus, this Court 
finds that it was agreed that Mr. Lang make plans to form a new company and that he 
5 'Agreement' is defined as "a Illutuaiunde[sianding between two or more persons nbout thdr relative 
rights and duties regarding pa ... t or future performances ... " nnd 'authority' is den ned as "(h~ right or 
permission to act legally on another's behalf: the power delegated by a principal to an agent:' BLACK'S 
LAIVDICTlO1'ARY. 7'" Ed. (1999). 
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o subsequently approached Mr. Spiro with the understanding of the parties, including 
Plaintiffs. Mr. Lang breached no duty in so acting; even if he did so without 
authorization. 
Additionally, there is !!Q evidence in the record that Mr. Lang was forming a rival 
or competing company. Even though Mr. Lang made plans to form a new company to 
assist with the condo conversion projects, he breach no fiduciary duty owed to Plaintiffs 
because the new company was not intended to be a rival. 
Regardless, even assuming that Mr. Lang did breach a duty owed to Plaintiffs, 
Mr. Lang never formed the new company and Mr. Spiro never left EAR. Thus, Plaintiffs 
incurred no damages. Summary judgment is appropriate where, regardless of any breach, 
plaintiff suffered no damages. Grot v. First Bank of Schaumburg, 684 N.E.2d 1016, 1017 
o (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (affirming a trial court's grant of summary judgment regardless of 
whether or not defendants breached a fiduciary duty because the plaintiffs suffered no 
damages "cognizable at law".). 
2. DivulgiIig Confidential EAR Information 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang breached his fiduciary duty when he disclosed to 
VEF's Mr. Huang the terms of the BTS during their July meeting. The BTS contained a 
confidentiality provision that allowed disclosure to the parties' "partners, members, 
attorneys, agents, employees, accountants and banks." The BTS was entered into by Mr. 
Toberman, his wife, Beth Toberman, the Toberman Entities, and the GEF Partnerships. 
VEF was EAR's partner in the three condo conversion projects and acted as a lender to 
both La Tour Partners LLC, and Austerlitz Partners LLC. EAR, La Tour, and Austerlitz 
are three (3) of the named businesses defined as the "Toberrnan Entities" in the BTS. 
o Therefore, the disclosure of the BTS to Mr. Huang was within the contemplated scope of 
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the confidentially exception contained in paragraph 2 of the BTS. and breached no duty 
owed to by Defendant to Plaintiffs. 
3. Approaching EAR Contacts 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang breached the duty of good faith that he owed to 
Plaintiffs by approaching VEF while he was still employed by EAR. 
As stated above. the record is undisputed that Mr. Lang discussed the new 
company with Mr. Huang with the agreement of the parties involved. including Mr. 
Toberman and EAR. Additionally. Mr. Lang never formed the new company and never 
took the business away from EAR. Finally. despite the fact that VEF terminated its 
professional relationship with Plaintiffs, Mr. Haung stated in his affidavit that he did not 
terminate VEF's relationship with EAR because of Mr. Lang, but as a result of his 
conversations with Mr. Gootrad concerning the BTS and the underlying dispute that gave 
rise to it. 
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Counts III and IX of Plaintiff s complaint. 
B. Count IV, Tortious Interference with Business Relations 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang tortiously interfered with EAR's business 
relationship with VEF when Mr. Lang met with Mr. Huang and disclosed the terms of the 
BTS. 
To prevail on a claim of tortious interference, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the defendant (1) acted without privilege, (2) acted with intent to injure, (3) induced a 
third party to act, and (4) caused financial injury. Tom's Amusement Co., Inc., v. Total 
Vending Servs., 243 Ga. App. 294 (2000); Willis v. United Family Life Ins., 226 Ga. 
App. 661, 665 (1997). The first prong, which requires that the defendant acted without 
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privilege, is commonly referred to as the "stranger doctrine". Under a claim for tortious 
interference, the tortfeasor must be a stranger to both the contractual relationship at 
question and to the underlying business relationship. Id. at 296. 
At the time that Mr. Lang and Mr. Huang met, Mr. Lang was the Executive Vice 
President of Acquisitions at EAR and the key contact between EAR and VEF. In 
addition, Mr. Lang held ownership interests (whether direct or indirect) in La Tour 
Partners LLC, Trafalgar Partners LLC, Austerliz Partners LLC, and Bonapart Partners 
LLC, which are companies under the TobermanJEAR umbrella and which had business 
relationships with VEF. As such, Mr. Lang was not a "stranger" to EAR's relationship 
with VEF. 
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Count IV Plaintiff s complaint. 
C. Count VIII, Conspiracy to Breach Fiduciary Duty 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang induced Kevin DOff, an EAR employee, to breach 
his duty to EAR by providing to Mr. Lang the September 22, 2005, letter that contained 
confidential financial information related to one of the condo conversion projects. At that 
time, Mr. Lang was no longer an EAR employee. 
Georgia recently recognized an action for conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty or 
for "aiding and abetting" a breach of fiduciary duty. Insight Tech., Inc. v. Freight Check, 
LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19 (2006). The elements of a conspiracy to breach fiduciary duty 
claim are: 
(I) through improper action or wrongful conduct and 
without privilege, the defendant acted to procure a breach 
of the primary wrongdoer's fiduciary duty to the plaintiff; 
(2) with knowledge that the primary wrongdoer owed the 
plaintiff a fiduciary duty, the defendant acted purposely and 
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Id. at 25-26. 
with malice and the intent to injure; (3) the defendant's 
wrongful conduct procured a breach of the primary 
wrongdoer's fiduciary duty; and (4) the defendant's tortious 
conduct proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. 
Looking at these elements, and the evidence provided, Mr. Lang stated that he 
was a member of Montrachet Partnership LLC which was invested in the Discovery 
Palms condo conversion project. He therefore was entitled to information regarding the 
project.6 Perhaps Mr. Door was not the proper person to disclose the information, but 
Mr. Door, "the primary wrongdoer" could have refused to give the information. There is 
no evidence in the record that Mr. Lang acted with malice or intent to injure. 
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Count VIII of Plaintiff s complaint. 
D. Count V, Computer Theft and Computer Trespass 
Plaintiffs allege the Mr. Lang accessed his EAR email account in September, after he 
was terminated, and forwarded an email to Ms. Richards. In support of their opposition to 
Mr. Lang's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs provided a copy of the email chain 
in which an August 18th email was sent from Mr. Lang's EAR email account on 
September 26, 2005. Plaintiffs allege that accessing the email account and forwarding 
the email violatedD.C.GA. § 16-9-93(a)(3), establishing computer theft and trespass 
torts.7 
6 "A member may: ..... (B) Obtain from time to time upon reasonable demand: (I) True and complete 
information regarding the state of the business and financial condition of the limited liability company .. . 
(iii) Other information regarding the affairs of the limited liability company as is just and reasonable ... " 
O.e.G.A. § 14-Il-314 
7 "Any person who uses a computer or computer network with knowledge that such use is without authority 
and with the intention of converting property to such person' s use in violation of an agreement or other 
legal obligation to make a specified application or disposition of such property shall be gUilty of the crime 
of computer theft." O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(a)(3). 
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Mr. Lang provided affidavit testimony that he did not access his EAR account, 
that he did not return to the EAR premises after his termination, and that he had no means 
to access his EAR account remotely after he was terminated. Ms. Richardson received 
the forwarded email on September 26'h and then forwarded it to Mr. Lang's EAR PMI 
account (a separate and umelated-to-EAR company). Ms. Richards also provided 
affidavit testimony that she may have asked someone to forward her the email from Mr. 
Lang's former email account. 
Plaintiffs provided no evidence that Me. Lang had access to his EAR email 
account or to the premises after his termination. The mere inference that Mr. Lang may 
have accessed the account is insufficient in the face of the evidence and the standards on 
a motion for summary judgment. 
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Count V of Plaintiff's complaint. 
E. Count I, Deceptive Trade Practice Act 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang violated O.C.G.A. § 10-1-372, the Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act, when he wrongfully held himself out as a vice president of EAR, 
made misleading statements about EAR, and solicited EAR contacts.8 
Deceptive trade practices are clearly defined under the Act and include actions 
such as misrepresenting the origins of goods or services, creating confusion with regard 
to sources or sponsorship of goods/services, or incorrectly representing the quality, uses, 
or geographic origin of a good/service. O.e.G.A. § 10-1-372. The specific remedy for a 
8 In oral argument, counsel for Defendant asserted that Plaintiffs had "abandoned" their opposition to 
summary judgment on this Count and Counts II, VI, VII by their omission of argument in the briefs on 
behalf of Plaintiffs. In light of Plaintiffs' and Plaintiffs' counsel's absence from oral argument, this Court 
assumes that Plaintiffs have not abandoned their opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment 
on Counts I, II, VI, VII and will evaluate the claims under the appropriate summary judgment standard. 
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violation of the Act is injunctive relief. Lauria v. Ford Motor Co., 169 Ga. App. 203 
(1983) ("While that Act expressly does not preclude other actions based on common law 
or other statutory authority, the sole remedy provided under this Act is injunctive 
relief. "). Plaintiffs neither allege actions in violation of the Act, nor do they claim 
remedies available under the Act. 
Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count I of Plaintiffs 
Complaint is GRANTED. 
F. Count II, Misappropriation of Trade Secrets 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang took EAR contacts, financial data, and confidential 
information from EAR when he was terminated, thus misappropriating EAR's trade 
secrets. 
Misappropriation of trade secrets involves (1) the acquisition of a trade secret by a 
person who knows (or has reason to know) that the trade secret was acquired by 
inappropriate means, or (2) the disclosure of a trade secrete by someone who (a) used 
improper means to obtain the trade secret, or (b) at the time of the disclosure knew that 
the trade secret was obtained improperly or held with some duty not to disclose it. 
CMAXlCleveland, Inc. v. VCR, Inc., 804F. Supp. 337, 358 (M.D. Ga., 1992). O.C.G.A. 
§ 10-1-7 61 defines trade secrets. 9 
In deposition testimony, Mr. Toberman identified the BTS as the trade secret 
misappropriated by Mr. Lang. The BTS, however, is outside of the definition of trade 
9 O.C.O.A. § 10-1-761 (4) "Trade secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but not 
limited to, technical or non-technical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a program, a device, a 
method, a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual 
or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which 
information: A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its 
disclosure or use; and (B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain 
its secrecy." 
12 
o 
C) 
C) 
secrets under O.e.G.A. § 10-1-76\. In addition, Mr. Lang submitted the deposition 
testimony of a Senior VP of EAR (Ms. Brown) and an EAR paralegal (Ms. Black) that 
EAR held no trade secrets within the definition ofO.C.G.A. § 10-1-76\. There is no 
question of fact regarding Mr. Lang's alleged misappropriation of trade secrets. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Count II of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
G. Counts VI and VII, Trespass to Chattels and Conversion 
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lang removed physical files belonging to EAR when he 
was terminated. In deposition testimony, Mr. Toberman identified only the BTS as the 
"missing files" that are the basis of these claims. Mr. Lang was a member in and/or had 
an indirect ownership in several of the Toberman Entity signatories to the BTS. Mr. 
Lang was also an investor in the condo conversion projects which were assigned to the 
GEF Partnerships as a result of the BTS. Accordingly, Mr. Lang had an interest in the 
BTS and his possession of such constitutes neither trespass to chattels nor conversion. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment on 
Counts VI and VIII of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
IV. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendant's 
Counterclaims 
During oral argument, Defendant abandoned Count II (Conversion of LLC 
Interests), Count III (Tortious Deprivation of LLC Interests), and Count V (Conversion of 
other Personal Property). Thus, Count I (Breach of Contract), Count IV (Conversion of 
Promotional Bonuses), and Count VI (Attorneys Fees and Expenses) remain the subject 
of Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 
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A. Count I, Breach of Contract 
Defendant Lang alleges that Mr. Toberman and EAR breached the terms of his 
employment with EAR by not paying bonuses due to Mr. Lang and for generally diluting 
the amount of previously paid bonuses as a result of Mr. Toberman's alleged 
embezzlements. Under Mr. Lang's 1999 letter of employment, he was to be paid bonuses 
that were tied to the acquisition, refinancing, or disposition of property through what was 
referred as "promote pool bonuses". Mr. Lang's right to receive the bonuses were 
contingent upon his continued employment with EAR. 
Mr. Lang provided the closing documents for the Brookfield Commons property 
which closed on August 24,2005, prior to Mr. Lang's termination from EAR. Thus, Mr. 
Lang claims that he is entitled to a bonus associated with that property. Additionally, Mr. 
Lang claims that Mr. Toberman breached the implied duty of good faith inherent in his 
employment contract lO when Mr. Toberman allegedly embezzled funds which reduced 
the promote pool on other properties out of which Mr. Lang's previous bonuses were 
paid or were due. 
A promote pool bonus, as described by Mr. Toberman, was a certain employee's 
share of what EAR earned on a particular real estate asset. Mr. Toberman provided an 
affidavit stating that no promote pool bonuses were paid to any EAR employees in 
conjunction with the sale of the Brookfield Commons property and implied that EAR 
made no money on the transaction. 
To the extent that EAR made profits on the disposition of the Brookfield 
Commons property, which occurred prior to Mr. Lang's termination, Mr. Lang would be 
10 There is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in every contract. S. Bus. Machines of 
Savannah v. Norwest Fin. Leasing, 194 Ga. App. 253 (1990) (HIt is a well-recognized principle of contract 
law that both parties are under an implied duty of good faith in carrying out the mutual promises of their 
contract. "). 
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However, there is no evidence in the record suggesting that either EAR made profits on 
Brookfield Commons or that any EAR employees received a bonus on that particular 
property. Without a profit on the property, there is no claim for Mr. Lang's entitlement 
to a bonus, and thus no breach. 
On Defendant's second claim for breach, he submits the documentation of 
numerous unjustified account transfers or debits made by Mr. Toberman on behalf of 
several Toberman Entities, including EAR. The unjustified account transfers and debits, 
however, were not associated with a particular property for which Mr. Lang was paid a 
promote pool bonus, nor was there an attempt to explain the connection between those 
account activities and Mr. Lang's rights arising under his employment contract with 
o EAR. Counsel for Defendant made the analogy during oral argument that in a contract to 
collect rain water, there is the implied duty not to poke holes in the bucket. Similarly, in 
a suit for breach of contract, there must be some attempt made to identify which bucket 
was collecting the rain water and/or the amount of rain water lost as a result of the holes. 
Without either, the breach of contract claim cannot withstand Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
Count I of Defendant's counterclaim. 
B. Count 4, Conversion of Promotional Bonuses 
Defendant Lang alleges that Mr. Toberman and EAR converted promotional 
bonuses owed to him under this employment contract with EAR. 
To prevail on a claim for conversion, a party must demonstrate that they had title 
o to and right of possession in valuable property, that they made a demand for the property, 
15 
o and that the other party had possession of the property after refusing to surrender it. City 
of College Park v. Sheraton Savannah Corp., 235 Ga. App. 561, 563 (1998). 
Georgia courts recognize conversion claims for money, but the allegedly 
converted money must be "specific and identifiable, or specifically 'earmarked' for some 
particular purpose." Hudspeth v. A & H Constr., 230 Ga. App. 70, 71 (1997); see also, 
Unified Servs, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co, 218 Ga. App. 85,89 (1995). Earmarking funds 
overcomes the presumption that the party in possession of the money also has title to it. 
Adler v. Hertling. 215 Ga. App. 769, 772-74, (1994) (finding the "specific and 
identifiable" nature of funds necessary to establish plaintiffs title and right to possess). 
Defendant Lang points to the detailed chart of alleged embezzlements as proof that the 
converted funds are specifically identifiable or earmarked. As stated above, however, the 
o alleged embezzlement chart details unjustified account transfers between various 
Toberman Entities and is not directly tied to any specific property for which Mr. Lang 
was owed a promotion pool bonus or an augmentation of a previously paid bonus. 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on 
Count IV of Defendant's counterclaim. 
C. Count VI, Attorneys Fees and Expenses 
Defendant Lang seeks to recover attorneys' fees and expenses associated with this 
litigation under O.e.G.A. § 13-6-11. Because all of the claims in Defendant Lang's 
counterclaim are disposed of as described in this Order, there is no basis for an award of 
attorneys' fees or expenses under the statute. 
o 
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V. Defendant's Motion to Strike the Contradictory Testimony of 
Plaintiff Scott K. Toberman 
Defendant Lang petitioned this Court to strike paragraphs 4 and 5 of Mr. 
Toberman's Affidavit filed on February 15,2007, and several lines of Mr. Toberman's 
deposition testimony under the contradictory testimony doctrine. See, Prophecy Corp. v. 
Charles Rossignol, Inc., 256 Ga. 27 (1999) ("In a Motion for Summary Judgment where 
the only evidence presented by the Respondent is contradictory testimony, such 
testimony shall be stricken and the evidence shall be construed against him if no 
reasonable explanation is offered for the contradiction."). 
This Court, having decided Ibe two pending cross motions for summary judgment 
without addressing the testimony in question, and in doing so finally resolving all issues 
in Ibis case, finds this motion moot. 
VI. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby GRANTS Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on all Counts of Plaintiffs complaint and GRANTS Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Counts I ,IV, and VI (the remaining counts after 
Counts II, III, and V were abandoned by Defendant) of Defendant's counterclaim. 
SO ORDERED this # day of August, 2007. 
CYNTHIA D. WRIGHT, JUDGE/or 
ELIZABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Copies to: 
European American Realty, Ltd. 
3525 Piedmont Road 
Building 5, Suite 10 
Atlanta, Georgia, 30305 
Attn: Scott K. Toberman 
Scott K. Toberman 
2875 Wyngate Road 
Atlanta, Georgia 30305 
David Nutter 
115 Perimeter Center Place 
Suite 632 
Atlanta, Georgia 30346 
J. Steven Parker 
Page Perry LLC 
1040 Crown Pointe Parkway 
Suite 1050 
Atlanta, Georgia 30338 
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